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Abstract
DONOGHUE V STEVENSON IS so well known that its facts and judgment need little further rehearsal or
rendition. Indeed, the case and its aftermath are some of the most documented in the long common law
tradition. Many treat Donoghue as if it were the greatest of all “great cases.” That being said, a vibrant
debate about the precise meaning and ambit of its legacy still continues, especially regarding the putative
leading judgment of Lord Atkin and its influence on the development of the common law of tort. Indeed,
part of Donoghue’s greatness is considered to be its almost Delphic sweep and interpretive elusiveness;
its importance is matched by and reinforced by its indistinctness. However, there is a tendency to
approach the case as if its origin and later pre-eminence were somehow preordained—that it was always
destined to be great and that it exerted its huge influence by dint of its irresistible rationale and inevitable
effect.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.

This commentary is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol51/
iss2/9

701

Commentary
SOME “WHAT IF” THOUGHTS: Notes on Donoghue v
Stevenson
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
I.

REIMAGINING HISTORY..................................................................................................................... 703

II.

BEER AND SNAILS............................................................................................................................. 704

III.

LORDLY MATTERS.............................................................................................................................. 707

IV.

BROADER CONSIDERATIONS............................................................................................................ 709

V.

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................... 712

“All the ancient histories, as one of our wits say, are just fables that have been
agreed upon.”
—Voltaire

*

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Canada. This short commentary is based on a talk I gave in May 2012 at a conference
celebrating the 80th anniversary of Donoghue v Stevenson; it was held in Paisley, United
Kingdom and organized by the University of West Scotland. I am grateful to Derek Morgan,
Cynthia Hill, Jennifer Leitch, and Ian Langlois, as well as other friends and colleagues, for
their critical assistance and intellectual support.

702

(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

DONOGHUE V STEVENSON IS so well known that its facts and judgment need little

further rehearsal or rendition.1 Indeed, the case and its aftermath are some of the
most documented in the long common law tradition. Many treat Donoghue as if
it were the greatest of all “great cases.”2 That being said, a vibrant debate about the
precise meaning and ambit of its legacy still continues, especially regarding the
putative leading judgment of Lord Atkin and its influence on the development of
the common law of tort. Indeed, part of Donoghue’s greatness is considered to be
its almost Delphic sweep and interpretive elusiveness; its importance is matched
by and reinforced by its indistinctness. However, there is a tendency to approach
the case as if its origin and later pre-eminence were somehow preordained—that
it was always destined to be great and that it exerted its huge influence by dint of
its irresistible rationale and inevitable effect.
Yet this assessment seems to depend on a very crude depiction of both the
evolution of the common law and social history generally. The assumption seems
to be that law is a rational exercise that is largely set apart from social history and
that both law and social history unfold in a reasonably orderly, if unconnected,
manner. This Whiggish sense of inevitability to the path of both law and social
history is mistaken and misleading. Far from being a prime example of law
and history’s methodical and almost inexorable operation and development,
Donoghue is better understood as an occasion on which one can glimpse law and
history’s organic and catch-as-catch-can quality. In short, Donoghue is a great
case that illustrates the contingent nature of law, greatness, and history. Despite
appearances to the contrary, Donoghue (and Lord Atkin’s judgment in particular)
is not tantamount to a jurisprudential sermon on the mount that wields its
influence and authority by that fact alone.
In this commentary, I look at Donoghue and its legacy through the lens of
a different and speculative kind of inquiry. I seek to isolate what was and was
not important about Donoghue in exploring the development and dynamics
of legal change; the focus is upon asking what if the case had not unfolded in
precisely the way that it did and what if there had been some slight changes
in the surrounding circumstances and the dramatis personae. This may seem a
rather obscure and elliptical approach to the case and the common law. However,
this way of proceeding might allow a more critical and less trite analysis of how
cases achieve greatness and how the developmental process of the common law
works. Indeed, answering these “what if ” questions demands confronting, if not
resolving, some very big questions about law, law and society, and their change.
1.
2.

[1932] AC 562, 101 LJPC 119 [Donoghue cited to AC].
For my own account, see Allan C Hutchinson, Is Eating People Wrong? Great Legal Cases and
How They Shaped the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 6.
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I. REIMAGINING HISTORY
Alternate or counterfactual history exists somewhere in that shadowy intellectual
zone between the more familiar and traditional domains of fact and fiction. In
attempting to explore a number of “what if ” situations, this intellectual approach
takes an authentic or agreed-upon point in history, posits some slightly different
factual assumptions, and then spins out an alternate or competing narrative
account of how events might have worked out differently (or not). While this
approach can be utilized as an entirely fictional and imaginative endeavour,3
it can also be used to serve more strict and rigorous historiographical ends.
The latter is achieved by isolating certain events or focusing on the role of a
particular person in the traditional historical account, imaging that that event
had not happened or that person had not existed or had acted differently, and
then seeking to evaluate whether history might or might not have unfolded
differently. In this way, the relative importance of any particular event or person
can be better measured or adjudged.4 As such, this disputed mode of historiographical analysis can contribute to more nuanced and informed accounts of
history. Imaginative reconstruction can be combined with factual reporting to
offer a more revealing and suggestive account of history. In particular, it can be
deployed to help isolate what might be central and what might be peripheral to
the unfolding and explanation of specific events that did occur.
For example, a continuing debate in history and related disciplines is over
the extent to which certain historical figures were essential to the historical record
and dynamic of the twentieth century: Would there have been a Holocaust if
Hitler had not existed? Would apartheid have been swept aside in South Africa
without the leadership of Nelson Mandela? Or would India’s independence have
occurred differently if Mahatma Gandhi had not been around? In sum, what if
these characters had each fallen victim to some childhood illness or accident that
had ended their lives? Would history have turned out fundamentally differently?
Or, to put it another way, what if these figures had existed, but at a different place
and time? Would their impact have been as significant or even noticed? While
these questions obviously do not have definitive answers, a serious consideration
of them does oblige a critical reassessment of certain accepted truths.
3.
4.

For two famous examples of alternative history in literature, see Vladimir Nabokov, Ada or
Ardor: A Family Chronicle (Toronto: McGraw-Hill International, 1969); Philip Roth, The
Plot Against America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004).
See e.g. Niall Ferguson, ed, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, revised ed (New
York: Basic Books, 1999); Martin Bunzl, “Counterfactual History: A User’s Guide” (2004)
109:3 Am Hist Rev 845.
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More broadly understood, these “what if ” questions raise the historiographical chestnut of the relation between individual agency and broader social forces
in their shaping of history. Any answer to the stated questions will both depend
on and illuminate what is thought to be the balance between human personality
and social circumstance. By positing an alternative history in which these people
did not exist or acted very differently, it becomes possible to provide a more
subtle, if indeterminate, assessment of the respective roles that personality and
social dynamics played. While it seems reasonable to concede that events may
not have happened in exactly the same way without these individuals, it seems
a stretch to suggest that the larger historical pattern and outcomes would have
been vastly different: Nazi Germany was not only about Hitler; South African
apartheid was wobbling anyway; and India, like other colonies, would likely
have achieved independence at some similar point in time. Yet, this assessment
may itself reveal certain contested assumptions and propositions about historical
development and change. Accordingly, it is important to remain open to the
broader historiographical debate in offering more focused accounts of particular
historical events.
That said, what are the uses and consequences of applying this alternative or
counterfactual thinking to Donoghue? What can such an approach do to provide
new or telling insights into the case, the common law, and the relationship
between law and society? Of course, the nature of this jurisprudential inquiry is
unavoidably conjectural and inconclusive. Nevertheless, by isolating a series of
occurrences and the roles of particular people, this inquiry might uncover some
suggestive and hidden insights into how law develops and how law and society
interact over time. Accordingly, the ambition of this commentary is not to offer
definitive or grand answers to some perennial questions of jurisprudence. Instead,
its more modest goal is to shed some light on one episode in the contingent
and experimental drama of the common law.5 It will be for others to determine
the cogency and suggestiveness of my provocations for a broader account of the
common law’s changing doctrines.

II. BEER AND SNAILS
A first question to ask any theorist of the common law might be: Would the history
of tort law have been significantly different if May Donoghue had not gone to
the Wellmeadow Café on that summery August evening? Of course, this would
5.

For more on a broader understanding of the common law and society, see Allan C
Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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mean that Donoghue would not have entered the law reports. So, to that extent, at
least, the history of tort law would be different. However, it does not follow that
the history of tort law would be different in some fundamental or substantive
way—whoever drank that fateful bottle of ginger beer might well have initiated
similar litigation, or Donoghue or another person might have consumed some
other noxious substance in similar circumstances on a different date. To address
and unpack these particular queries, it is necessary to move quickly to some
deep and contestable issues about how law changes and takes shape and how the
relationship between legal doctrine and social conditions is understood. While
it is hard to conclude that a general tort of negligence would not have seen the
doctrinal light of day if Donoghue had not gone to the Wellmeadow Café, it is
also unconvincing to imagine that everything would have nonetheless unfolded
in much the same way.6
The next task is to distinguish between those events and personalities that
might have had some alternative effect on the law’s development and those that
might not have had such an effect. For instance, while the non-involvement of
Lord Atkin or Walter Leachman (Donoghue’s lawyer) might well have had a
significant impact on what occurred and followed, it is much more difficult to
speculate that the non-involvement of Lord Tomlin or Wilfrid Normand (David
Stevenson’s appellate counsel) would have had a significant effect. However,
even this distinction is open to challenge and can be seen to depend upon larger
assumptions about the dynamics of historical change. Was it important that
Donoghue went to the Wellmeadow Café as opposed to another establishment?
That she had a ginger beer as opposed to another beverage? That her friend paid for
the drink and not her? All these elements will take on particular significance and
resonance depending on what a commentator’s historiographical commitments
are about the progress of law, society, and history.
So, for the sake of argument, it might be assumed that the involvement of Lord
Atkin and Leachman was significant for both the Donoghue litigation itself and
its subsequent elevation to a “great case.” From an alternative history perspective,
6.

Of course, there is an analogue to all this in so-called chaos theory in which the butterfly
effect is given pride of place (i.e., in deterministic non-linear contexts, large systems are
sensitive to changes in their initial conditions such that a very tiny change in one place can
bring about vast changes throughout the systems). See Edward N Lorenz, “Predictability:
Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” (Address
delivered at the 139th Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
Washington, DC, 29 December 1972), [unpublished], online: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences <http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/
Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf>.
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the key issue would be not only whether this involvement was significant, but
also how significant it was: What if Leachman had not championed Donoghue’s
plight? What if there had been a different bench of law lords? What if Lord
Buckmaster’s pinched judgment had won out over Lord Atkin’s more expansive
effort? Or, what if later judges and lawyers had taken more of a shine to Lord
Macmillan’s judgment than Lord Atkin’s? As focused as these questions might be,
they do offer a keyhole glimpse into the wider world of jurisprudential debate
about how the common law changes—what is the nature of the relationship
between the common law’s development and changing social dynamics?
Almost all legal scholars maintain that the substance and development of
law are relatively autonomous (i.e., they are neither entirely beholden to nor
completely independent of socio-economic forces). However, this proposition is
so trite and capacious as to be almost meaningless. There is a world of difference
between a stance that maintains that law is primarily separate from society but
is partly determined by it, and one that insists that law is primarily determined
by society but is partly separate from it. So, while it might well be that law
has some relative autonomy from its larger social and historical context, the
more compelling questions are about how relative and how autonomous it
is. Accordingly, it is incumbent on legal scholars to give some substance and
specificity to the claim about law’s relative autonomy. A “what if ” approach is one
way to contribute to that jurisprudential task.
The challenge, of course, is to determine why Donoghue did take place and
unfold as it did as much as why it might not have done so. There had to be a
certain confluence of forces and findings in place for the considerable shift to
a tort of negligence to occur at all.7 Unless one is a dyed-in-the-wool legalist,
it beggars belief to imagine that negligence’s introduction and acceptance
was simply a matter of internal and intellectual engagement within the legal
community; there were definite political leanings and social values in place that
made the creation of a tort of negligence more likely than not or, at least, that
made its creation less than unacceptable to the judicial profession. As Lord Esher
had stated almost fifty years earlier, “[A]ny proposition the result of which would
be to show that the Common Law of England is wholly unreasonable and unjust,
cannot be part of the Common Law of England.”8 Moreover, Donoghue is an
extension of a principle that Justice Benjamin Cardozo articulated in 1916 in
the American case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co,9 to which the judges in
7.
8.
9.

See Robert L Rabin, “The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation”
(1981) 15:4 Ga L Rev 925.
Emmens v Pottle (1885), 16 QBD 354 at 357-58, 50 JP 228.
217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (App Ct 1916) [MacPherson].
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Donoghue referred.10 This might lead to the conclusion that, even if Donoghue
had not seen the doctrinal light of day, the courts would have found another
occasion on which to develop the intellectual roots of negligence and to tap into
the prevailing milieu around what is “reasonable” and “just.”
It also bears noting that, contrary to common understanding, Donoghue
did not release tort liability for negligence onto an unsuspecting legal world.
While contract was the primary mode of civil obligation in the 1930s, there
existed a patchwork quilt of statutory and judicial schemes of tort liability
that imposed on actors a range of duties to take care. While Donoghue extended
negligence liability to some new areas and grounded tort liability where none
had existed previously, it also reduced liability in other old areas from its
existing strictness to a more negligence-focused liability. As is so often the case
with the common law, two steps forward was accompanied by one step back; the
path of the common law is not the unidirectional or straightforward one that
many envision or wish for.

III. LORDLY MATTERS
Even if Lord Atkin had not sat on the Donoghue bench (or Lord Tomlin had sided
with Lord Buckmaster), the tort of negligence might well have emerged, albeit
not in the majestic form of the “neighbour” principle. In his supporting judgment
(and what is considered the swing vote), the recently appointed Lord Macmillan
refused to go as far as Lord Atkin in extending liability to all negligent actors; he
confined himself to the manufacturer-consumer relationship in his imposition
of negligence liability aside from contract. However, as well as finding against
Stevenson on the basis of negligence, he did throw down the doctrinal gauntlet
to later generations of judges and jurists by declaring that “[t]he categories of
negligence are never closed.”11 Similarly, Lord Thankerton was more tentative
than Lord Atkin, but hinted strongly at the possibility that a duty of care might
exist more generally even if it is “impossible … to catalogue finally, amid the
ever varying types of human relationships, those relationships in which a duty to
exercise care arises apart from contract… .”12 Indeed, Lord Macmillan and Lord
Thankerton’s less daring and more step-by-step approach might well have been
more in line with the traditional incrementalist spirit of the common law.
10. See Donoghue, supra note 1 at 577.
11. Ibid at 619.
12. Ibid at 603.
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Also, it was surely not the rhetorical potency of Lord Atkin’s bold judgment
alone that carried the day and made Donoghue into a great case. For Donoghue
to rise to its historic status, there had to be a few generations of judges and
jurists (and, of course, society at large) who bought into the idea and practice
of an expanding principle of negligence liability. Although the reaction to the
law lords’ decision in Donoghue was predictably mixed, there was more support
than criticism. Among the legal community, it was celebrated as a necessary step
forward in negligence law and as a decision that brought the law more in line
with contemporary sensibilities. The eminent Sir Frederick Pollock praised the
“Scots Lords,” including Lord Atkin, in the Law Quarterly Review for “overriding
the scruples of English colleagues who could not emancipate themselves from
the pressure of a supposed current of authority in English Courts.”13 Insofar as
the decision pierced public consciousness, there was warm approval. Whereas
the newspaper The Scotsman wrote that the decision “should be welcomed by
the public,”14 the Law Times said that the decision was “revolutionary” and
represented a “radical change” in tort law that was “strictly in accord with the
needs of modern economic times.”15
The staying power of Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle can be attributed to
an organic combination of its intellectual appeal and its socio-political acceptability. Although the House of Lords wavered in its commitment to a principled
articulation of tort law, it often sought to satisfy Lord Atkin’s aspiration to
identify “some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of
which the particular cases found in the books are but instances.”16 Most boldly,
in Anns v Merton London Borough Council in 1977, Lord Wilberforce declared
that it was no longer necessary to proceed on a case-by-case basis.17 Instead, he
said courts should ask “whether … there is a sufficient relationship of proximity
or neighbourhood” between the harmed plaintiff and the negligent defendant.18
If so, a prima facie duty of care is established unless “there are any considerations
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty… .”19 And,
as late as 1990 in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, the House of Lords revised Lord
Atkin’s neighbour principle to encompass public policy concerns such that, even
13. “The Snail in the Bottle, and Thereafter” (1933) 49:1 Law Q Rev 22 at 22.
14. (27 May 1932), cited in Allan C Hutchinson, Laughing at the Gods: Great Judges and How
They Made the Common Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 124.
15. (1932) 173 LT 411, cited in ibid.
16. Donoghue, supra note 1 at 580.
17. (1977), [1978] AC 728, [1977] 2 All ER 118 [cited to AC].
18. Ibid at 751.
19. Ibid at 752 [citations omitted].
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if foreseeability and proximity or neighbourhood are found to be present, a duty
of care will only arise when it is “fair, just and reasonable that the law should
impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other.”20
Furthermore, even if we assume, contrary to fact, that Lord Atkin’s judgment
did not prevail over Lord Buckmaster’s narrower and more skeptical judgment, it
is by no means certain that a tort of negligence would not have become part of the
law. Lord Buckmaster’s opinion may have galvanized opposition and given life
to a political momentum to establish an even more expansive tort of negligence
or even strict liability. Indeed, it has to be remembered that Lord Buckmaster,
who had been a relatively progressive and experienced Liberal politician in the
1920s and 1930s, was as concerned with corralling the activist role of courts
in a democracy as he was with stymieing the creation of the substantive tort of
negligence itself. Against the political and social context of the time (in which the
welfare state was midwifed), it is hard to resist the conclusion that the government
might well have introduced some form of legislation to do exactly what Lord
Atkin’s opinion did for negligence liability in the common law.
Accordingly, asking questions from a counterfactual or alternate history can
help to illuminate or, at least, hint at those historical circumstances and personalities that were likely more required than not for a Donoghue-like principle
to become part of the common law. There is nothing scientific or determinative about such an approach, but it does enable a more critical perspective that
avoids a knee-jerk Panglossian response to each and every twist and turn of legal
doctrine. The common law is constantly moving, but never arriving anywhere in
particular.

IV. BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
One way to approach the issue of what is and is not important in determining
the role of Donoghue and its component parts in the development of negligence
liability is to gather together all of the case’s pertinent and contextual features and
then ask which ones are essential to the development of a tort of negligence and
which are not. On such a basis, while it is clear that some small changes would
undercut the importance and even existence of Donoghue as a landmark case,
it is less obvious which changes would be sufficient to prevent completely the
establishment of a tort of negligence. In other words, while some small changes
in character and circumstances might effectively nullify the impact of Donoghue
20. [1990] 2 AC 605 at 618, [1990] 1 All ER 568, Bridge of Harwich LJ.
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itself and its doctrinal template, it would require much more substantial changes
to prevent entirely the introduction of negligence liability into English law over
the following decades. So, for instance, although Lord Atkin’s presence or absence
in the case might prove to be important in mapping out exactly how the law
would have developed without his neighbour principle, it is far from conclusive
that a similar tort of negligence would not have seen the light of day.
It is a considerable analytical stretch to insist that Lord Atkin’s involvement
alone was pivotal to the development of negligence liability in English law and
that, without him, there would have been no tort of negligence. After all, the tort
of negligence did take hold in American law around the same time as Donoghue.21
At the risk of sounding silly, it is apparent that Lord Atkin played no role in such
an occurrence; the case occurred in another jurisdiction and several years before
Donoghue. This strongly suggests that it was less the particular characters and
circumstances of Donoghue that drove English law’s evolution towards negligence
and more the social dynamics in play that propelled it towards negligence law.
In short, the time was right and, if it had not been Lord Atkin, it might well
have been someone else who seized the doctrinal day and laid down a test for
duty or proximate cause. Of course, this argument raises the obvious difficulty
of explaining why English law did not later take a similar turn to American legal
doctrine in the 1960s. The California case of Greenman v Yuba Power Products
in 1963 ushered in the doctrine of strict liability that soon took hold across the
United States and replaced much of the jurisprudence on negligence.22
Efforts to elucidate the divergence of legal doctrine between England’s
continuing adherence to negligence liability, especially for products liability,
and the United States’ move towards strict liability might take a number of
routes. Two main ones come to mind: first, that different regimes of legislative
protection were enacted for consumers in the two jurisdictions (i.e., the English
political landscape allowed for more consumer-friendly legislative interventions
than the American political landscape); and second, that the practical application
and judicial exception making that occurred rendered the apparently different
legal doctrines more similar than different (i.e., the American legal doctrine is
less strict in operation and the English doctrine is more exacting than might be
initially appreciated).23 That said, there might well be a host of other explana21. MacPherson, supra note 9.
22. Greenman v Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal 2d 57, 27 Cal Rptr 697 (Sup Ct).
23. In Donoghue itself, Lord Macmillan was mindful to emphasize that he “rather regard[s] this
type of case as a special instance of negligence where the law exacts a degree of diligence so
stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety.” Supra note 1 at 611-12.
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tions that pass historiographical muster. Again, it bears emphasizing that there is
no theoretical formula or generalizable account that will work in all instances to
explain historical development or what is needed to reach the tipping point for
significant social or legal change.
Nevertheless, it does seem possible to draw some general observations
about the role of Donoghue and its context in the history of negligence liability.
The challenge is to do so without making extravagant claims about the overall
evolution of legal doctrine across the jurisprudential board. Both society in
general and law in particular are far too messy in their patterns and practices to be
reducible to neat equations of cause and effect. The historical interaction between
one feature of society and another cannot be described or formulated once and
for all: “[T]he system as a whole has no single ideological imprint.”24 The fact is
that not only does law fail to conform to any internal or external deep logic, but
also the specific relation between external forces and internal rationality resists
generalization; no one account of that relation is valid for all time and all places.
The development of the common law is neither serendipitous nor scientific. As
such, the relationship between law’s development and changing social relations
is more complicated and indeterminate than is usually allowed or conceded; it
defies simple or consistent elucidation. Nonetheless, this does not preclude a
profitable analytical account of one episode in the common law’s development.
While the history of English tort law might have unfolded differently if
Donoghue had not walked into the Wellmeadow Café, if Leachman had not
been on a mission to skewer Paisley’s ginger beer manufacturers, or if Lord
Atkin had not been on the bench that day, it would not be so different a history
looked at from today’s standpoint more than eighty years later. The path travelled
may have been slightly different in timing and terrain, but the overall direction
and destination would surely have been much the same. Is it really feasible to
maintain that without these three personalities, the whole of negligence law
would be entirely and meaningfully different?
None of this is to say that the involvement of Donoghue, Leachman, or
Lord Atkin was not important. It was. They had a continuing impact on the fine
texture and local development of the law. But the impact of particular individuals
must be measured and assessed in light of the pervasive social and historical
forces in play in 1932 and soon after. To prioritize individual personalities over
24. Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1997) at 225-26. For a more fully developed account of this insight, see Allan C
Hutchinson, It’s All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) at 216-51.
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social forces (and vice versa) as a general matter of historiographical principle is
mistaken; each interacts with and influences the other. On another day and in
another case, their involvement might well have been decisive. Accordingly, it can
be concluded tentatively that the precise interaction of the general social forces
in play and the particular situational dynamics in law can unfold very differently
from one context to another. Donoghue is simply one chapter, albeit a significant
one, in the evolution of the common law. The doctrinal story and plot of the
common law might have experienced a significant twist as a result of Donoghue’s
occurrence or non-occurrence. Whether the law’s tale would have turned out
entirely differently over time seems possible, but unlikely.

V. CONCLUSION
As I was completing this short commentary, it was the fiftieth anniversary of John
F. Kennedy’s assassination. There was much talk about how things in the United
States and the world might have happened differently if he had not died in Dallas
in late November 1963. Would Vietnam have happened? Would the Cold War
have played out differently? Would the push for civil rights have been stronger?
And would Kennedy himself have become and remained the iconic figure that he
is now perceived to be?25 These are each fascinating and unanswerable “what if ”
questions. But their posing and the ensuing efforts to answer them do offer an
occasion to muse on larger questions of historical judgment and historiographical
insight. Kennedy was a “great man” by most standards. Yet, extant social and
political forces of his presidency and its aftermath shaped, at least in some part,
his contemporary status and later influence. In the same way that Kennedy and
his legacy are inseparable from his and our times, so also is Donoghue. To attempt
to detach the force of personality from the impact of larger currents is folly; to
attempt to develop a grand account of how they work to constitute and reconstitute each other is also foolhardy.

25. See e.g. Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 2003); Robert Dallek, Camelot’s Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (New
York: HarperCollins, 2013).

